

THE ART OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION IN *CARAKA SAMHITĀ*

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Although detailed attention has been paid in *Caraka Samhitā* on the methodology of scientific knowledge seeking, one may still ask how would one proceed in constructing a specific theory, be it a theory of disease and remedy or of origin of life and its culmination in death? It has been shown¹ that the scientific enterprise as a *practice* of investigation of causes; their examination, establishment and defence as hypotheses; and finally the application of these as principles, can be summed up as a process of learning (*sambhāṣa*), dialectic (*vāda*), methodological reflection (*kārya parīkṣā*), investigation of causes (*hetu parīkṣa*), and strategy of successful verificatory practical application (*cikitsā siddhi upāya*) of principles. Further, there can hardly be any doubt that definite criteria of rationality and objectivity² operate in this entire epistemic process. One may, however, still ask: what are the grounds for the theory of tastes (*rasa*), attendant formations (*doṣa*), and body elements (*dhātu*)? How does one arrive at these fundamental concepts which are the foundations of the theory of disease and health in *Caraka Samhitā*? In what follows we shall address ourselves to these specific questions.

2. Since Caraka's theory of health and disease presupposes on the one hand the *Saṃkhyāna* theory of reality in entirety, and on the other hand the *Vaiśeṣika* categories of thought, one can say that a specific theory has to proceed with the following considerations:

- (i) Logico-epistemic considerations of a categorical kind, or *meta-theoretic* considerations;
 - (ii) Epistemic considerations about the means of knowledge and criteria of its validity;
 - (iii) Zero order theory of reality, or a world-view, or *meta-physical* considerations;
 - (iv) First order *physical theory* (of health and disease in our case);
- and (v) Critical examination, appraisal and defence of the theory.

One has to first intuit by the internal eye (*jñāna cakṣu*) that what sort of things are there in all, about which a theory could be constructed. These metatheoretic considerations lead to the postulation of substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), the general or unificatory (*sāmānya*), the particular or the differentiating (*viśeṣa*), and the relation (*samvāya*). That is to say, one must agree purely on intuitive grounds, without asking for causal evidence, that there are substances, qualities and actions, and further, that these are general, particular, and relational in character. Unless one agrees to something like this, one cannot have a theory or a world view. Once this is agreed to, the question arises as to how are these to be known and ascertained? There must be a method of postulating, examining and establishing propositions. The method of knowing or investigating (*parīkṣā vidhi*) the evidences (*hetu*) is central here. Thus, one proceeds by postulating a proposition (*pratijñā*); supporting it by an evidence (*hetu*) which has been examined (*hetu parīkṣā*) perceptually (*pratyakṣa*), inferentially (*anumāna*), testificationally (*etiḥya*), and analogically (*aupamya*); giving adequate examples (*dṛṣṭānta*) and showing their relevance (*upnaya*) to the case under consideration, so as to finally lead to the conclusion (*nigmana*) which then is considered established. Propositions will be valid if they satisfy these epistemological criteria. Thus, being clear about what sort of things are to be looked for in the world of experience and how their knowledge is to be ascertained as valid or invalid, we can take the third step of enumerating the *fundamental* substances, qualities, actions, etc. This will include the knowing subject, basic objects of knowledge, their qualities and actions, their general and specific natures, and various relations.

In the third step, a meta-physics or a world-view is constructed. Thus it has been argued in *Caraka Saṃhitā*, for instance, that the substances are the conscious (*puruṣa*) and the elements (*bhūta*), the qualities are *sattva*, *raja* and *tama*, the actions are causation (*kārya-kāraṇatā*) and transformation (*pariṇāma*). There are general and particular substances, qualities and actions and their relations which, when established, lead to the ground-theoretic structure of *Saṃkhyā*. Once this is achieved, the task of building a first order theory of health and disease becomes easy. Even it becomes easier to answer questions such as what is meant by life and death, or, for that matter, who lives and who dies; who is healthy and who is sick?

While proceeding at the fourth stage, we must not forget the guiding principles of the first and the second stages. And, of course, our theory of health and disease must be compatible with the ground theory of reality at large. Thus, the substances of the theory of health and disease are the *dhātus* and the *rasas*; the qualities here are the *tridoṣa* and the *rajas* and *tamas*; the actions are of the doctor and the medicine on the patient. Enumeration of these and discussion of their specificities, generalities and relations in respect of disease, health, and medicines constitute the entire body of knowledge of the *Āyurveda*.*

*See Appendix I for details of the entire Order of Knowledge.

The final stage involves the critical examination at a dialectical level (*vāda mārṅa*), and as a continuing process, of such specific theories, as also at the practical level by their application in curing the specific cases of disease (*cikitsā siddhi*).³

It may then be concluded from the above considerations that in Caraka's view a theory will not be *adequate* unless it takes into consideration the guiding intuitive framework at the first level; it will not be *valid* unless it has been established in accordance with the epistemological criteria at the second level; and it will not be *compatible* unless it is in accordance with a ground theoretic structure of reality at large. Thus, a theory can claim soundness only if it is *adequate*, *valid*, and *compatible* in the above sense of the terms.

3. A *theory*, however, must not be confused with a *science*. A theory investigates only the causes (*kāraṇa*), whereas a science has, in addition, to investigate the application or implementation or effect (*kārya*) as also the purpose or aims (*prayojana*). It has been said that the *causes* of the science of *Āyurveda* are the guiding principles of the first level. That is to say, the science has to investigate *its substances, qualities, etc.* in the light of the problem of health and disease, life and death. Once these causes have been investigated, it is clear that the purpose is to sustain the state of health which is the state of equidistribution of specific elements of the body (*dhātusāmya*). The *practice* of this sustaining of health is the effect (*kārya*) which is the action for the sustaining of the said equidistribution (*dhātusāmya kriyā*). These three aspects then characterise a specific science completely, and every science must reflect these.

4. Referring specifically to the science of *Āyurveda* we should notice that the methods of diagnosis, curing the disease, *etc.* are to be included in the *kārya*, whereas the methods of arriving at a theory of disease and health are to be included in the *kāraṇa*. The two must not be confused. The former has been discussed under *kārya parikṣā* while the latter has to be understood in the light of the epistemic methods of investigation (*parikṣā vidhi*). One may form a diagnostic hypothesis upon examination of a specific disease (*roga viśeṣa parikṣā*) in accordance with the general epistemic norms of examination, but this hypothesis will presume the general theory of disease and health to which any doctor subscribes. The diagnostic hypothesis about a specific case will be verified if the disease is cured, but it will not falsify the general theory of disease and health in case the patient is not cured. The falsification of the general theory must be attempted, if at all, at that very level at which the theory was constructed.

It is, however, interesting to note that although the methods of verification of the diagnostic hypothesis (*cikitsā siddhi upāya*) have been quantified, the methods of examination of the evidence (*hetu parikṣā*) have not been so quantified. But one can easily transfer these methods at the level of theoretic construction by talking

of the methods of verification of the evidence (*hetu siddhi upāya*). One, therefore, need not go beyond *Caraka Saṃhitā* to incorporate the concepts of measurement, counting, quantification, and experiment which are already included in *cikitsā siddhi upāya* or strategies of therapeutic success.

5. It is important to remark that the condition of compatibility of the first order theory of disease and health* (the central concepts being *doṣa*, *rasa*, and *dhātu*) with that of the ground-theory has important consequences both for therapy and the methods of theoretic investigation. The root cause of all disease, nay all suffering, according to the ground theory, is held to be the corruption of will, reason, and memory (*dhī-dhṛti smṛti vibhramṣa*). All the actions that are undertaken under this state of corruption are called the 'wrong-doings of reason' (*prajñāparādha*) which are then the immediate causes of disease and suffering. Therefore, even the methods of investigation (*parīkṣā vidhi*) and dialectic (*vāda mārga*) will be corrupt, not pure, under such a state of corruption. They can only sharpen the intellect (*prabasta buddhi*), not make it pure and truth-bearing (*satyā buddhi*). Therefore, if one wants to achieve true competence in both the first order and the ground theories, one must resort to methods of destroying the corruption and restoring the pure state (*tattva smṛti*). This is the method of psychological techniques (*yoga mārga*),⁴ which then is a prerequisite of the dialectical method (*vāda mārga*) being effective in the defence and critical examination of one's theories.

It then seems that the *Vaiśeṣika-Saṃkhyā* paradigm with its two attendant techniques of *vāda mārga* or logicotechnics and *yoga mārga* or psychotechnics had emerged as the dominant world-view which then was presupposed in the construction of first order theory such as that of health and disease. Indeed there would be no surprise if other theories of fine arts (music, dance-drama), polity (*artha*) and architecture were also constructed within the *Vaiśeṣika-Saṃkhyā* world-view. [This paradigm was perhaps subsequently challenged by the Buddhists on the one hand and the Jains on the other, and it may be interesting to explore how they conceived of theory construction at the ground level and the first order level.]

6. The technique of theory construction summarised above has far reaching consequences for scientific epistemology. Firstly, it suggests that theory construction cannot proceed in an *ad hoc* manner. It is not a hit-or-miss trial process of conjectures or inductions and their verifications or falsifications. The technique, therefore, does not allow of *radically* mistaken theories utterly epistemically distant from the ground theoretic metaphysics. Secondly, then, a specific first order theory cannot be conceived except in the light of the ground level zero order theory. All that which is conceived in accordance with the intuitions of the kinds of all the entities that there are in the world, and therefore in accordance with the ground

*See Appendix II for the detailed structure of this theory.

theoretic structure is science, rest is non-science. This science must observe certain standards of investigation, criticism, appraisal, refutation, and defence. A specific theory (of *dhātu*, *rasa* and *doṣa* say) is upheld in a specific scientific enterprise (the science of *Āyurveda*) which involves learning, dialectic, methodological reflection, observation, verification, and application. This discipline-specific-theory will be characterised by its commitment to certain entities [substances, qualities, and actions (human and mechanical)] in their *specific* and *general* modes, and their specific and general *relations*. The theory will then be the basis of a specific science which will then apply it systematically for the achievement of certain aims. Therefore, although theory construction, verification, and appraisal is the central activity of the *scientists*, other activities of applying it towards the achievement of definite aims must also be carried out within the scientific enterprise.

Both the *science* and the *scientist* have to be understood in a radically different way. A scientist is the sort of person who is fully aware of the ground theory which determines and guides his outlook and his search for truth in specific domains. The ground theory guides his interpretations, as well as the second order theory that he is seeking to construct, verify, and appraise. He must also subsequently apply this theory towards the aims for which it is devised. The scientific enterprise, on the other hand, is *always* conscious of the "ideology" or ground theory with which it has constantly to strive for greater and greater compatibility. Its theory is not strictly autonomous, it is not "ideology neutral". The theory is able to *explain* the phenomena in a specific domain *because* it is standing on the shoulders of the ground theory. The relation between the ground theoretic structure and the first order theoretic structure is not reductionistic. The first order theory is rather a sort of *appropriate attachment* to the ground theory appropriately constructed for the purpose of causal explanation of the phenomenon under investigation. "Ideology" and science must therefore remain closely linked. Ideology as ground level theoretic structure about reality in entirety is a necessary condition for the birth of a specific scientific theory.

7. Progress or growth of knowledge can here be understood only in terms of greater and greater degree of compatibility of a specific theory in a specific scientific domain, with the ground theory or metaphysic or ideology. Both the ground theory and the first order theory must constantly face critical examination as a result of which changes may be needed in the former which may necessitate changes in the latter, or the latter theory alone may be sought to be modified without changing the former. All this activity will mark the growth of knowledge. Changes in the first order theoretic structure *alone* ensure greater degree of compatibility which will, however, not be occasions for any 'scientific revolution'. If, for instance, a community of 'scientists' adopts a theoretic structure as adequate without clear grasp of a ground level theory and then subsequently rejects this theory (in the light of new

facts or under pressure of new anomalies) in favour of another, it would *appear* that a *revolution* in outlook or world-view has occurred. But had the community been clear about the ground level theoretic structure then, at the first hand, a mistaken first order theory would not have been adopted and the occasion for its rejection would not have arisen, and secondly, the changes would have appeared only as achievement of a greater degree of compatibility of the first order theory with the ground theory. Realisation of a mistake, therefore, cannot be acclaimed as a revolution.

True revolutions in this entire epistemic enterprise will, however, occur only if some of the intuitions are rejected or others are added (*e.g.*, addition of *abhāva* as the seventh category perhaps under pressure from the Buddhists), and/or the ground theoretic structure is severely modified (*e.g.*, rejection of *Samkhyāna* metaphysics in favour of Buddhist metaphysics). Such revolutions will indeed be 'ideological revolutions' with far reaching consequences, for radical changes will ensue in how the reality is seen, how the world is to be confronted and negotiated, and how the life is to be led. Such changes in the ground level metaphysic or even replacement of the old ground theory by a *radically different* alternative will indeed necessitate radical changes at the first order theoretic level. This will lead to the formation of just another alternative community of seekers who view reality differently. Such a situation however does not demand that the older metaphysic becomes defunct although it may be adequately modified without changing its core. These alternative world-views will then progress by criticism, with *common* norms and rational standards of refutation, defense, and examination. It is possible, in such an epistemic process, that many alternative ground theories with their first order theoretic attachments are pursued by different communities in any given society.

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- ⁴*Charak Samhitā*, Jamnagar : Gulab Kunwarba Ayurvedic Society, 1949, pp. 993–1004, *Sutras* 98–154. Also V. Shekhawat, Therapeutic Interpretation of Yoga in *Charak Samhitā*, Paper presented in International Conference on *Yoga and Research*, Lonavala, India, December 1984.

APPENDIX—I.

ORDER OF KNOWLEDGE IN *CARAKA SAMHITĀ*

INTUITIONS AS PRESUPPOSITIONS OF EVERY SCIENCE INCLUDING THE GROUND THEORY

- (a) *sāmānya, viśeṣa, samvāya*
- (b) *dravya, guṇa, karma*
- (c) *kāraṇa, kārya, prayojana*

These are to be known by the internal eye (*jñān cakṣu*) and express the sum total of all the entities that underlie the given world of experience—sensuous and non-sensuous. These imply that while attempting to apprehend the world of experience, one must proceed with locating the complex of substances (*dravya samgrah*), the complex of qualities (*guṇa samgrah*), and the complex of actions (*karma samgrah*) in their specific, general, and relational modes.

Definitions :

- Def₁ (*sāmānya*) : The assimilative is the tendency (*pravṛtti*) of increment (*vṛddhi*) and uniting (*ekatvakaraṇ*) of all things at all times. It is the cause of similarity (*tulyārthatā*).
- Def₂ (*viśeṣa*) : The differentiative is the tendency of decrement (*hrās hetu*) and separation (*pṛthakatva*) of all things at all times. It is the cause of dissimilarity (*atulyārthatā*).
- Def₃ (*samvāya*) : The eternal (*nitya, niyata*) relation of 'law' (*samvāya*) of the primordial unity (*apṛthagabhāva*) of substances and their attributes.

These three are the fundamental causes on which the following three derivatively depend.

- Def₄ (*guṇa*) : The quality is the inactive (*niśceṣṭa*) component of lawful relation (*samavāyi*).
- Def₅ (*dravya*) : The substance is that which is an active (*saceṣṭa*) component of the lawful relation (*samavāyi*) and which sustains qualities and action (*karma guṇa āśrita*).

Def₆ (*karma*): The action is the cause of contact (*saṃyoga*) and separation (*vibhāga*); is sustained by substance (*dravya āśrita*) and is the activity (*kriyā*) of performance (*kartavya*).

The last three presuppositions have not been defined but *illustrated*. *Kāraṇa* or causes are illustrated by *sāmānya*, *dravya*, etc. *Kārya* or effect or what a science seeks to attain as an end-result is illustrated by the case of *Āyurveda* whose *kārya* is *dhātusāmya*. The *prayojana* or what the science undertakes or affects is illustrated by *dhātusāmyakriyā*.¹

If we take the case of ground theory, then its causes are the same six 'sets', its effect is *tattva smṛti* and affection will consist of *tattva smṛti kriyā*.

Thus, any theory, be it the ground theoretic metaphysic or the first order theory of a specific domain, must proceed on the above guidelines which are intuited truths directing us as to what sort of things must one look for in the world in general or in a specific domain of inquiry in particular. As *thing*-concepts, these truths are the *causes* underlying the world of experience, while as *concepts* (of things) these are the *causes* of every theoretic structure being its presuppositions or first principles guiding its construction.

2. STRUCTURE OF THE GROUND THEORY

Basic Entities :²

(a) *Dravya samgrah* : Five elements (*khādīni*), *ātma*, *mana*, *kāla*, *desa*. Sense-endowed substance (*śendriyam dravyam*) are conscious (*cetanā*) and not endowed with senses (*nirindriya dravyam*) are unconscious (*acetanā*).

(b) *Guṇa samgrah* : *indriyārthāḥ* (*śabda*, *spārśa*, *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*); *guru*, *laghu*, etc. ; of the *ātma* from *buddhi* to *prayatna*; *para*, *apar*, etc. ; *sattva*, *raja*, and *tama*.

(c) *Karma samgrah* : *prayatnādi*, *ceṣṭā*, *gati*.

The Problems that Necessitate the Ground Theory :

1. Why must the *puruṣa* be postulated ?
2. If *ātma* is considered inactive (*niṣkriya*), self-constructing (*svatantra*), etc., then how does it act (*kriyā*) and suffer (*anīṣṭaṣu yoniṣu*) ?

¹*Caraka Saṃhitā*, p. 12, *sūtra* 53.

²*OS*, p. 10, *sūtra* 11.

3. The knower of the phenomena (*kṣetrajñā*) cannot be held eternal (*sāśvat*) if prior phenomena (*kṣetra*) is admitted ; but without a known phenomenon (*jñeya kṣetra*) there cannot be a prior knower ?
4. How can an uncorrupted (*avikār*) *ātma* undergo specific acts of suffering (*vedanākṛta viśeṣa*) ?

The Structure of the Ground Theory :

1. The entire reality as given in experience can be described in terms of twenty-four *dravya* which are as follows :
 - (a) *aṣṭa dhātuki prakṛti* consisting of *puruṣa* or *cetanā-dhātu*, *ākāśa-dhātu*, *jala-dhātu*, *vāyu-dhātu*, *agni-dhātu*, *pṛthvi-dhātu*, *buddhi* and *ahaṃkāra*.
 - (b) *mana* as sensorium.
 - (c) ten *indriyas*—senses of knowledge and action.
 - (d) five *indriyārthas* : *śabda*, *sparśa*, *rūpa*, *rasa*, and *gandha*.
2. The *guṇas* in general are three—*sattva*, *raja*, and *tama*. The *guṇa* of *mana* is that it is one (*eka*) and microscopic (*aṇu*). The *guṇa* of *ākāśa* is *śabda*, of *vāyu* is *śabda* and *sparśa*, of *agni* is *śabda*, *sparśa* and *rūpa*, of *jala* is *śabda*, *sparśa*, *rūpa* and *rasa* and of *pṛthvi* is *śabda*, *sparśa*, *rūpa*, *rasa* and *gandha*.
3. To regulate the ten *indriyas*, to regulate oneself, to think (*vicār*) and investigate (*ūha*) are the *karmas* of *mana*. The *indriyas* then activate (*prvṛtta*) the *buddhi*. The *karmas* of *rāsi puruṣa* are generation (*udaya*) and dissipation (*pralaya*).

Argument 1 : The *puruṣa* is the root cause as also the sustainer of the unity (*yoga-dharam*) of the twenty-four *dravyas*. The processes of *karma*, *karma phala*, *ahaṃkāra*, *dehāntargati* and *smṛti* cannot be explained except by postulating an independent and incorruptible *puruṣa* as the root cause.

Argument 2 : The *ātma* or *puruṣa* is the knower (*jñāh*) and it knows by the contact of the senses (*karṇai yogāt*) as it also fails to know due to lack of contact (*ayogāt*) or due to defiling of senses (*karṇam avaimalyāt*). The entire process is due to conjunction (*sarvam samyogāt vartate*). The *puruṣa* is eternal (*nitya*) and not accessible phenomenologically (*bhāvāt agrāhyam*). The eternal is called 'unthinkable' (*acintya*) and 'unconstructed' (*avyaktam*). The *bhūtātma* alone is not characterisable (*na upalabhyate*), therefore not knowable (*na vidyate*).³

Argument 3 : From *avyakta* is born *buddhi*, from *buddhi* is born *aham iti manyate*. Subsequently, in order (*yathākramam*) arise from the *ahaṃkāra* five elements,

³CS, p. 985, sūtras 63–64.

and then is born the man with body (*sampūrṇa sarvāṅga puruṣa*). That *puruṣa* is again dissociated (*viyujyate*) when the mode of dissolution arises (*pralaye iṣṭaiḥ bhāvaiḥ*). The process moves like a wheel (*cakravat parivartate*) from *vyakta* to *avyakta* and *vice-versa* by the infection of *rajas* and *tamas* (*rajastambhyām āviṣṭa*). Those infested with ego-sense (*ahaṃkāra parāḥ*) and dialectic (*dvandve śakti*) suffer generation and dissolution (*udaya pralaya*) while others do not.⁴

Argument 4: All living things (*prāṇi*) structure themselves into life (*ātmanā ātmānam prāṇaiḥ tantrayate*) according to their own nature (*yathāsvena*) for there is no other constructor (*tantraka*).⁵

Argument 5: The causes of suffering (*duḥṣa hetvāḥ*) are corruption of will, reason, and memory (*dhī, dhṛti, smṛti vibhramā*); the trapping of actions in time (*kāla karmaṇām samprāpti*) and improper use of sense objects (*asātmya arthāgamah*). Those who are ignorant about it are always ill (*ajñyah arthebhyah tṛṣṇāṃ upadatte : sadā āturah*). Therapy in which proper knowledge of causes is acquired (*vinopadhama cikitsā*) is freedom giving (*naiṣṭhikī*).⁶

⁴CS, p. 986, *sūtra* 66–67.

⁵CS, p. 988, *sūtra* 77.

⁶CS, p. 992, *sūtra* 94–96.

APPENDIX II

THE STRUCTURE OF THE FIRST ORDER THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC THERAPY

Fundamental Problems

What is a disease and how is it caused ? How can the disease be cured ? Which *vedanā* is treated, of the past, present, or future ? Can all cases of disease be cured ? Can one free oneself entirely from disease and death ? What is life and *āyu* ?

The Basic Entities

The *dravyam* are *dhātu*, *rasa* and *doṣa* which are ultimately *pancabhautikam*. Their *guṇas* are *śabdādi* and *guru-ādi*. The *karmas* are the five *vamanādi*.

*Dhātu samgrah*⁷ : *māṃsa*, *lohita*, *meda*, *vasā*, *aṣṭhi*, *majjā*, *śukra*, (*garbha*).

Rasa samgrah : *svādu*, *amla*, *lavaṇa*, *kaṭuka tikta*, and *kaṣāya*. The *rasa* is the object of taste (*rasanā arthah*) ; its substantial basis (*dravyam*) are water (*āpa*) and earth (*kṣitī*) and are differentiated (*viśeṣe*) by ether, fire, and air.⁸

Śarīradoṣa samgrah : *vāta*, *pitta*, and *kapha*.

Mānasadoṣa samgrah : *raja* and *tama*.

Śarīradhātu guṇāḥ are *guru-laghu*, *śīta-uṣṇa*, *snigdha-rukṣa*, *manda-tīkṣṇa*, *sthira-sara*, *mṛdu-kaṭhina*, *viṣad-picchil*, *ślakṣaṇa-khar*, *sūkṣma-sthūla*, and *sāndra-dravya*.⁹

The *doṣa guṇāḥ* are also *rūkṣa*, *śīta*, *laghu*, etc. The *rasa guṇāḥ* are also *guru*, *laghu*, etc. and the *rasas* are divided according to them as *pārthiva*, *āpya*, *āgneya*, *vāyavya*, and *ākāśātmakāni*.¹⁰

The Structure :

- (a) The *śarīradhātu* increases by the use of foods (*āhārvikāraih*) of like qualities and decreases by the use of foods of unlike qualities. The increase and decrease of *dhātus* (*vr̥ddhi-hṛās-gamanam*) is called *vaiṣamyagaman*. The *dhātuvaiṣamyā* leads to disease (*kleśa*).¹¹

⁷CS, p. 1089, *sūtra* 10.

⁸CS, p. 14, *sūtra* 64.

⁹CS, p. 1089, *sūtra* 59.

¹⁰CS, p. 13, *sūtras* 59–61.

¹¹CS, p. 1080, *sūtra* 4.

(b) Nothing is a non-medicine (*anaruṣadhabhūta*). *Rasas* act by virtue of being substances (*dravya-prabhāvāt*) or by virtue of being qualities (*guṇa-prabhāvāt*), or both.

(i) *vāta* is subdued (*jayanti*) by the combination of *svādu-amlalavaṇa*.

(ii) *pitta* is subdued by *kaṣāya-svādu-tikta*.

(iii) *śleṣmā* is subdued by *kaṣāya-kaṭu-tikta*.

(iv) *vāyu* is provoked by *kaṭu-tikta-kaṣāya*.

(v) *pitta* is provoked by *kaṭu-amlalavaṇa*.

(vi) *kapha* is provoked by *madhur-amlalavaṇa*.¹²

(c) The variations in *rasa* combination can be of 63 types :

15 combinations of 2 *rasas* each.

20 combinations of 3 *rasas* each.

15 combinations of 4 *rasas* each.

6 combinations of 5 *rasas* each.

6 combinations of 1 *rasa* each.

1 combination of 6 *rasas* each.

63 combinations

(d) The main cause of endogenous (*nijasva*) diseases is the discordance (*vaiṣamya*) of *vāta*, *pitta*, and *kapha*. The exogenous diseases (*āganturogāḥ*) first arise and then lead to *doṣa-vaiṣamya*, whereas in case of *nija-rogāḥ*, there is first the *doṣa-vaiṣamya*.¹³

(i) The *doṣas* are in two states—normal (*prakṛtibhūta*) and abnormal (*kupita*). Moving in the entire body (*sarva śarīra carāḥ*) these 'humors' cause good or bad effects as they are normal or provoked. When normal, they are responsible for building, health, and happiness (*upacaya, bala, prasāda*), and when provoked, for disease (*vikār*).¹⁴ There are 80 *vātavikāra*, 40 *pittavikāra*, and 20 *śleṣmāvikāra*.¹⁵

(ii) The colon (*pakvāḥaya*) is the special seat of *vāta*, the lower stomach (*āmāḥaya*) is the specific seat of *pitta*, and the chest (*urah*) is the specific seat of *śleṣmā*.¹⁶

¹²CS, p. 15, *sūtra* 66.

¹³CS, p. 331, *sūtra* 57.

¹⁴CS, p. 332, *sūtra* 59.

¹⁵CS, p. 332, *sūtra* 10.

¹⁶CS, p. 332, *sūtra* 9.

(iii) *Vāyu* is highly energetic (*atibalam*), mobile and effective (*atīśighra-kāriṇam*) and widespread (*atīparubam*); *pitta* is the fire (*agni*) inside the *pitta* (*pittāntargata*) which gives rise to good and bad consequences depending on whether it is normal or abnormal; *kapha* is the liquid inside the *śleṣmā* (*śleṣmāntargataḥ soma*) and does good or bad when normal or abnormal.¹⁷

(iv) *doṣagati*: decrement (*kṣaya*), stability (*śthānam*) and increment (*vyrdhi*) are the three types of motions of humors (*doṣānam trividhā gati*). Another three types of motions are upward (*ūrdhvam*) downward (*adhaḥ*), and tangential (*tiryak*). Further, the motion is again of three types: *koṣṭhā*, *śākhā*, *marma-asthi-sandhiṣu*.

The seasonal change of *doṣas* (*kālakṛta gatiḥ*) occurs in six weathers as the accumulation (*caya*), provocation (*prakopa*), and sedation (*prāśama*) of *vāta*, *pitta*, and *kapha*, respectively.¹⁸

The humors can be classified as functioning naturally (*prakṛti*) or abnormally (*vaiḥkṛti*). The *prakṛta pitta* is responsible for digestion, the *prakupita* for diverse malfunctionings (*vikārāḥ*). The *prakṛta kapha* is the basis of strength (*oja*), the *vikṛta* for residue (*malah*). The *prakṛta vāyu* is responsible for all activity (*ceṣṭā*), and it is the vital force (*prāna*) of all living creatures.¹⁹

Argument 1: The root causes (*hetu samgrah*) of all the diseases are: wrong contact (*mithiyā yoga*), non-contact (*ayoga*), and excessive contact (*atīyoga*) of time (*kāla*), reason (*buddhi*) and sense objects (*indriyārthānām*). This is called 'inordinate conjunction' (*asātmya indriyārtha saṃyoga*) which leads to actions under misunderstanding (*prajñāparādha*).²⁰ Perennial change (*pariṇāma*) is another initiator (*prerak*) of diseases. These then lead to *dhātudoṣavaiṣamya*.²¹

Argument 2: For *dhātusāmya* one can resort to preventive therapy (*svastha vṛtta*) or curative therapy (*bheṣaja prayoga*). In curative therapy, for *śarīra vikāra* there are two types of therapies: inheritance curing (*daiva vyapāśraya*), and rational therapy (*yukti vyapāśraya*). And for *manas vikāra* there is psychological therapy involving subduing the psyche (*satva avajaya*, *mano nigraha*) or attaining knowledge (*jñān vijñān smṛti samādhi*).²²

¹⁷CS, p. 195, *sūtras* 10–12.

¹⁸CS, p. 296, *sūtras* 112–114.

¹⁹CS, p. 297, *sūtras* 115–118.

²⁰CS, p. 12, *sūtra* 54.

²¹CS, p. 331, *sūtra* 5.

²²CS, p. 182, *sūtra* 54.

Argument 3 : The diseases can be classified in three ways (*trayo rogāḥ*) : (1) *sādhyasādhyā* ; (2) *nija-āgantu* ; (3) *barira-manasāḥ*. Thus not all cases of disease are curable ; only the curable (*sādhyā*) are to be cured by curative therapy.

Argument 4 : The doctor cures the pain (*vedanā*) of past, present, and future (*trikāla*) ; for the present pain is remembered as the same as that occurred in the past and one fears that *it* will occur in future too.²³

Argument 5 : The coming together (*samyoga*) of *ṣaḍadhātu*, *mana*, and *indriya* is life ; their dispersal is death. These come together and disperse in a long cycle of life and death which fills the period of *udaya* and *pralaya* caused by the ego-sense (see Arg. 3, App. I).

²³CS, p. 178, *sūtra* 45.